assignment -7

The due date for submitting this assignment has passed. **Due on 2017-03-14, 23:59 IST.** As per our records you have not submitted this assignment.

Consider the following strategic games and answer the questions follow:

1) NE of the Game 1 is (are)  
   - (X, X)  
   - (Y, Y)  
   - Both  
   - None

**No, the answer is incorrect.**  
**Score:** 0  
**Accepted Answers:**  
*Both*

2) NE of the Game 2 is (are)  
   - (X, X)  
   - (Y, Y)  
   - Both  
   - None

**No, the answer is incorrect.**  
**Score:** 0  
**Accepted Answers:**  
*Both*

3) Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) in Game 1 is (are)  
   - X  
   - Y  
   - Both  
   - None

**No, the answer is incorrect.**  
**Score:** 0  
**Accepted Answers:**  
*Both*

4) Evolutionary stable Strategy (ESS) in Game 2 is (are)  
   - X  
   - Y  
   - Both
The members of a single population are randomly matched in pairs and play BoS, with payoffs given in following game table (L: Choose favorite concert and D: Choose less preferred concert)

5) This game has
   - A unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium
   - No symmetric pure strategies NE
   - None
   - Both

   No, the answer is incorrect.
   Score: 0
   Accepted Answers:
   Both

6) Mixed strategy NE of this game is
   - \((2/3, 1/3), (2/3, 1/3)\)
   - \((1/3, 2/3), (1/3, 2/3)\)
   - \((2/3, 1/3), (1/3, 2/3)\)
   - \((1/3, 2/3), (2/3, 1/3)\)

   No, the answer is incorrect.
   Score: 0
   Accepted Answers:
   \((2/3, 1/3), (2/3, 1/3)\)

7) Evolutionary stable mixed strategy of this game is
   - \(2/3, 1/3\)
   - \(1/3, 2/3\)
   - \(3/4, 1/4\)
   - \(1/4, 3/4\)

   No, the answer is incorrect.
   Score: 0
   Accepted Answers:
   \(2/3, 1/3\)

Consider the following prisoners’ dilemma game and answer the following questions

8) Unique NE of this game is
   - \((C, C)\)
   - \((D, D)\)
   - Both
   - None

   No, the answer is incorrect.
   Score: 0
   Accepted Answers:
   \((D, D)\)

9) If this game is repeatedly played finite times
   - \((D, D)\)

   Score: 0
   Accepted Answers:
   \((D, D)\)
In the last period Cooperate is a dominant strategy irrespective of history of the game.

In the last period Defect is a dominant strategy irrespective of history of the game.

In the last period Cooperate is a dominant strategy for a particular game history.

In the last period Defect is a dominant strategy for a particular game history.

No, the answer is incorrect.
Score: 0

Accepted Answers:
In the last period Defect is a dominant strategy irrespective of history of the game

SPNE of this twice repeated PD game is

- (C, C)
- (D, D)
- Both
- None

No, the answer is incorrect.
Score: 0

Accepted Answers:
(D, D)

SPNE of this PD game if it is repeated T (some finite no. bigger than 2) times, is

- (C, C)
- (D, D)
- Both
- None

No, the answer is incorrect.
Score: 0

Accepted Answers:
(D, D)

In an infinitely repeated PD game

- There is a unique equilibrium
- There are multiple equilibria
- There is no equilibrium
- None

No, the answer is incorrect.
Score: 0

Accepted Answers:
There are multiple equilibria

In an infinitely repeated PD game

Cooperate is always an equilibrium

Defect is always an equilibrium

Equilibrium depends on discount factor

None

No, the answer is incorrect.
Score: 0

Accepted Answers:
Equilibrium depends on discount factor

Suppose, In an infinitely repeated given PD game players use the following non forgiving strategy S:

Play Cooperate (C) in every period unless someone has ever played Defect (D) in the past and Play Defect (D) forever if someone has played Defect (D) in the past. This strategy is an SPNE if (δ is per period discount factor for both the players)
No, the answer is incorrect.
Score: 0
Accepted Answers:
$\delta \geq \frac{1}{2}$