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NPTEL

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Courses » Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory

Announcements **Course** Ask a Question Progress

Unit 5 - Week 4



Course outline

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Week 4

- Game Tree and Information Sets
- Strategies in Extensive form Games
- Extensive form Games with Simultaneous Moves and Their Normal Form
- Sub Game Perfect Equilibrium Part-I
- Sub Game Perfect Equilibrium Part-II
- The Art of War
- Ultimatum Game
- Stackelberg Model
- Quiz : Assignment-4

Week 5

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Assignment-4

The due date for submitting this assignment has passed. **Due on 2017-02-21, 23:59 IST**
As per our records you have not submitted this assignment.

Consider the following extensive form game.

1) No. of sub games this game has

1 point

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4

No, the answer is incorrect.

Score: 0

Accepted Answers:

3

2) No. of proper sub games this game has

1 point

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4

No, the answer is incorrect.

Score: 0

Accepted Answers:

2

3) No. of strategies player 1 has

1 point

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4

No, the answer is incorrect.

Score: 0

Accepted Answers:

2

4) No. of strategies player 2 has

1 point

- 1
- 2

Week 8

- 3
 4

No, the answer is incorrect.**Score: 0****Accepted Answers:**

4

5) No. of Nash equilibria of this game are

- 1
 2
 3
 4

No, the answer is incorrect.**Score: 0****Accepted Answers:**

2

6) No. of SPNE(s) of this game is (are)

- 1
 2
 3
 4

No, the answer is incorrect.**Score: 0****Accepted Answers:**

1

7) Which one of the following is a SPNE of this game

- (C, FG)
 (D, EH)
 (C, EH)
 (D, FG)

No, the answer is incorrect.**Score: 0****Accepted Answers:***(C, EH)*

Initially there is one firm in a market for cars. The firm has a linear cost function: $C(q) = 2q$. The market inverse demand function is given by $P(Q) = 9 - Q$. A second firm enters the market and the second firm has an identical cost function.

8) The Cournot Equilibrium output of the two firms will be

- $7/3, 8/3$ respectively
 $8/3, 7/3$ respectively
 $7/3$ for each firm
 $8/3$ for each firm

No, the answer is incorrect.**Score: 0****Accepted Answers:** *$7/3$ for each firm*

9) The Stackelberg Equilibrium output for both firms is

- $7/2, 7/4$ respectively
 $7/4, 7/2$ respectively

1 point



1 point

1 point

- 7/2 for each firm
- 7/4 for each firm

No, the answer is incorrect.

Score: 0

Accepted Answers:

7/2, 7/4 respectively

Two players use the following procedure to divide a cake. Player 1 divides the cake into two pieces, and then player 2 chooses one of the two pieces; player 1 obtains the remaining piece. The cake is continuously divisible (no lumps!) and perfectly homogeneous, so that each player cares only about size of the piece she obtains.

10) How many SPNE(s) does this game has

1 point

- 1
- 2
- Infinitely many
- Finitely many

No, the answer is incorrect.

Score: 0

Accepted Answers:

1

11) Which of the following is an SPNE of this game

1 point

- Player 1 gets bigger part and player 2 gets the smaller part of the cake
- Player 1 gets smaller part and player 2 gets the bigger part of the cake
- Both players get pieces of equal size
- none

No, the answer is incorrect.

Score: 0

Accepted Answers:

Both players get pieces of equal size

Consider a variant of ultimatum game in which the amount of money is available only in multiples of a cent.

12) In this game, each player has

1 point

- Infinitely many actions
- Finitely many actions
- Only one action
- Only two actions

No, the answer is incorrect.

Score: 0

Accepted Answers:

Finitely many actions

13) This game has

1 point

- 1 SPNE
- 2 SPNEs
- Finitely many SPNEs
- Infinitely many SPNEs

No, the answer is incorrect.

Score: 0

Accepted Answers:

2 SPNEs

Consider the following extensive form game with simultaneous move (a variant of BoS).

14) No. of strategies player 1 has

1 point

- 1
- 2
- 3
- 4

No, the answer is incorrect.

Score: 0

Accepted Answers:

4

15) No. of strategies player 2 has

1 point

- 2
- 4
- 3
- 1

No, the answer is incorrect.

Score: 0

Accepted Answers:

2



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