Intentionality

John Searle
What is Intentionality?

- Feature of consciousness/ property of consciousness

- Directedness/ aboutness/ of-ness

- Belief, Desire, intention, etc.
Intentionality & Experience

– Rohan *desires* to have a high profile job

– Rohan *believes* that high profile jobs are available in the market and he *intends to work hard*.

– Rohan’s desire will be *fulfilled iff* he works hard and secures good grade in the final exam.
II Directedness

– Teacher says that
– Rohan is doing well in the class
– Rohan is happy about his performance in the class and exam.

– Rohan gets good grade and the high profiled job.
III. unintentional states

– Rohan says that he is feeling sad.
– Rohan does not know why this sadness.
– Is Rohan depressed?
– Is he anxious of getting a well-paid job?

– Evidence of Undirected mental states
Thought and Action

- Intending and intention are just one form of intentionality (1983: 3)
- Intending is an intentional act

- Doing (drinking/ writing)
- Desiring or expecting (mental act)
Intentionality and Representation

– Intentional state (directed) object/ SAF
– Speech act (represent) object/ SAF in the world

– Intentional states are representational states

– Is intentionality necessarily linguistic?
Intentional expression

- Our baby daughter often cries for food
- Ladoo my friend’s pet keeps waiting till my friend arrives

-Language meaning is derived from intentionality not conversely.
Speech as expression

– Speech act: Illocutionary force
– $F(P)$
– Representative content $\rightarrow$ Direction of Fit
– Psychological Mode $\rightarrow$ Condition of Satisfaction
– $Pm(Rc)$
Direction of fit

- **Assertives:**
  - RCP is there in the class.
  - i) Mind → to → the world
  - ii) World → to → the mind
Condition of satisfaction

– Illocutionary act and intentional sincerity
– Internal
– Saying and Meaning must go together
Concept of Representation

- Cognitive Science and AI

- “I am most emphatically not saying that a belief is a kind of picture, not am I endorsing Tractatus account of meaning nor I am saying that belief re-presents something.” (1983: 9)
Searle on Representations

- Not syntactical
- Syntax will be causally determined
- Syntax in the computational process is observer relative

- For Searle, MR are related to feeling, experience, understanding, etc.
Content

- Content is revealed in different modes of intentionality working together.
- Perception: seeing, experiencing, believing, hoping, ....

- Understanding and imagination are higher order consciousness.